Category: Existential risk pessimism
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 8: Implications)
Suppose I’m right that there is an enduring tension between Existential Risk Pessimism and the Time of Perils Hypothesis. What follows?
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 7: An application)
I apply lessons learned about the value of existential risk mitigation to assess the cost-effectiveness of biosecurity. Leading cost-effectiveness estimates turn out to be overstated by several orders of magnitude because they do not appropriately model background risk.
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 6: Wisdom)
So far, we considered two arguments for the Time of Perils Hypothesis: an appeal to space settlement and an existential risk Kuznets curve. In this post, I look at a third argument, which appeals to wisdom.
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 5: An existential risk Kuznets curve?)
A second argument for the Time of Perils Hypothesis, due to Leopold Aschenbrenner, draws on the idea of an existential risk Kuznets curve. Could this argument vindicate the Time of Perils Hypothesis?
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 4: Space)
Parts 1-3 of this series suggested that the best way to reconcile Existential Risk Pessimism with the Astronomical Value Thesis is through the Time of Perils Hypothesis. But should we believe the Time of Perils Hypothesis? One argument that is often made for the Time of Perils Hypothesis appeals to space settlement. Let’s look more carefully at that argument.
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 3: The time of perils)
In Part 2 of this series, we looked at failed ways out of the tension between Existential Risk Pessimism and the Astronomical Value Thesis. Now let’s introduce a hypothesis that might resolve the tension.
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 2: Failed solutions)
In Part 1 of this series, we saw how the Pessimistic view that existential risk is high might come into conflict with the Astronomical Value Thesis that it’s very important to mitigate existential risk. It turns out that this conflict is robust to many ways of challenging the initial argument.
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 1: The problem)
Suppose that humanity faces very high levels of existential risk. Surely that means we should do more to mitigate existential risk, right? Surprisingly, the opposite is true.