Ineffective altruism: Some doubts about effective altruism
I’m a research fellow at the Global Priorities Institute, Oxford. There are many things I like about effective altruism. The purpose of this blog is to discuss what I don’t like about effective altruism in order to drive positive change within and outside of the movement. Discussions are long-form, structured into series, and informed by academic research.
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 3: The time of perils)
In Part 2 of this series, we looked at failed ways out of the tension between Existential Risk Pessimism and the Astronomical Value Thesis. Now let’s introduce a hypothesis that might resolve the tension.
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 2: Failed solutions)
In Part 1 of this series, we saw how the Pessimistic view that existential risk is high might come into conflict with the Astronomical Value Thesis that it’s very important to mitigate existential risk. It turns out that this conflict is robust to many ways of challenging the initial argument.
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Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 1: The problem)
Suppose that humanity faces very high levels of existential risk. Surely that means we should do more to mitigate existential risk, right? Surprisingly, the opposite is true.