Tag: Existential risk pessimism

Mistakes in the moral mathematics of existential risk (Part 2: Ignoring background risk)
I discuss a second mistake in the moral mathematics of existential risk: neglecting background risk. I show how a leading discussion of biorisk makes this mistake, and also makes the mistake discussed in Part 1 of this series.

Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 9: Objections and replies)
This post discusses five common objections to my paper and blog series “Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils”.

Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 7: An application)
I apply lessons learned about the value of existential risk mitigation to assess the costeffectiveness of biosecurity. Leading costeffectiveness estimates turn out to be overstated by several orders of magnitude because they do not appropriately model background risk.

Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 6: Wisdom)
So far, we considered two arguments for the Time of Perils Hypothesis: an appeal to space settlement and an existential risk Kuznets curve. In this post, I look at a third argument, which appeals to wisdom.

Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 5: An existential risk Kuznets curve?)
A second argument for the Time of Perils Hypothesis, due to Leopold Aschenbrenner, draws on the idea of an existential risk Kuznets curve. Could this argument vindicate the Time of Perils Hypothesis?

Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 4: Space)
Parts 13 of this series suggested that the best way to reconcile Existential Risk Pessimism with the Astronomical Value Thesis is through the Time of Perils Hypothesis. But should we believe the Time of Perils Hypothesis? One argument that is often made for the Time of Perils Hypothesis appeals to space settlement. Let’s look more…

Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 3: The time of perils)
In Part 2 of this series, we looked at failed ways out of the tension between Existential Risk Pessimism and the Astronomical Value Thesis. Now let’s introduce a hypothesis that might resolve the tension.

Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils (Part 2: Failed solutions)
In Part 1 of this series, we saw how the Pessimistic view that existential risk is high might come into conflict with the Astronomical Value Thesis that it’s very important to mitigate existential risk. It turns out that this conflict is robust to many ways of challenging the initial argument.